University of Miami Law Review
Volume 38

Number 5

Article 6

9-1-1984

City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.: Stare
Decisis Prevails, but for How Long?
Peter Prieto

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr

Recommended Citation
Peter Prieto, City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.: Stare Decisis Prevails, but for
How Long?, 38 U. Miami L. Rev. 921 (1984)
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol38/iss5/6

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of
Law Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
library@law.miami.edu.

City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc.: Stare Decisis
Prevails, but for How Long?
..........................................................

921

Roe v. Wade AND ITS PROGENY ...........................................
III. A kron's RATIONALE .....................................................
A . The Majority ....................... ..............................
B . T h e Dissent .......................................................
IV. A COMMENTARY ON Akron ...............................................

922
926
927
929
931

I.

INTRODUCTION

II.

V.

C ONCLUSION ............................................................

I.

938

INTRODUCTION

"[The]right of privacy. . . is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).

Ever since the landmark but controversial decision in Roe v.
Wade,1 the Supreme Court of the United States has addressed several of the complex and sensitive issues surrounding abortion.' In
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,3 the
Court for the first time decided whether an ordinance requiring
that all second-trimester abortions be performed in a hospital was
constitutionally permissible. The second-trimester hospitalization
requirement at issue in Akron was part of an ordinance 4 enacted
by the City Council of Akron, Ohio, to amend a previously enacted
ordinance regulating the performance of abortions. Three corporations operating outpatient abortion clinics and a physician who
had performed abortions in one of the clinics brought suit in the
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio seeking to enjoin
enforcement of virtually all of the ordinance's provisions.5 The de1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (parental notification); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (medicaid funding of abortions); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622
(1979) (parental consent); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1979) (reporting
and recordkeeping requirement, patient's written consent, spousal consent, and use of saline
amniocentesis as abortion technique); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (first-trimester
hospitalization requirement).
3. 103 S.Ct. 2481 (1983).
4. AKRON. OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 1870, § 1870.03 (1978).
5. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172
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fendants were the City of Akron, its mayor, its director of public
health, and its police prosecutor.' The plaintiffs argued that the
ordinance's provisions violated a woman's constitutional right to
terminate her pregnancy. 7 The district court held that the provision requiring that all second-trimester abortions be performed in
a hospital was constitutional because the requirement "furthers
the compelling state interest in the protection of maternal
health." 8 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
constitutionality of the hospitalization requirement provision.9 The
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari'0 and held,
reversed: The provision requiring that all second-trimester abortions be performed in a hospital "has 'the effect of inhibiting the
.. . vast majority of abortions after the first 12 weeks,' and therefore unreasonably infringes upon a woman's constitutional right to
obtain an abortion."" City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
II.

Roe v. Wade

AND ITS PROGENY

The difficulties surrounding the abortion controversy stem
from the different and competing interests that must be delicately
weighed in order to accommodate all of the parties involved.
(N.D. Ohio 1979).
6. Id. at 1181. The district court allowed two other defendants, Dr. Francois Seguin and
Patricia K. Black to intervene, but these defendants were to participate "solely in their
individual capacity as parents of unmarried minor daughters of child bearing age." Id.
7. Id. at 1198. The plaintiffs also based their challenge on the establishment clause, U.S.
CONsT. amend. I, and the equal protection clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The district
court, however, dismissed these challenges. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v.
City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1188-98 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
8. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 479 F. Supp. at 1215. The district court
found the regulations regarding parental consent, § 1870.05, informed consent, § 1870.06(B),
warrantless searches of clinics and hospitals in which abortions are performed, § 1870.09,
and disposal of fetal remains, § 1870.16, unconstitutional. Id. at 1200-07. The court, however, found the regulations regarding a 24 hour waiting period, § 1870.07, informed consent,
§ 1870.06(C) & (D), recordkeeping requirement, § 1870.08, abortion reporting requirement, §
1870.10, and medical instructions, § 1870.17, constitutionally valid. Id. at 1207.
9. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198 (6th Cir.
1981). The court of appeals also affirmed the constitutionality of the regulations regarding
informed consent, § 1870.06(B), and disposal of fetal remains, § 1870.16. Id. at 1205-11. The
court of appeals reversed as to the regulations regarding parental notice and consent, §
1870.05(A), 24 hour waiting period, § 1870.07, and informed consent, § 1870.06(C). Id. at
1205-08.
10. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 456 U.S. 988 (1982).
11. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2497
(1983) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79 (1976)).
12. See Paul & Schaap, Abortion and the Law in 1980, 25 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 497, 500-
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First, there is the woman's interest:1" because it is the woman that
carries the unborn in her womb, the decision of whether to abort is
to a large extent her own decision. The woman's interest, however,
is counterbalanced by two other important interests: the potential
life she carries-the unborn child"-and the state's interest in
protecting the general health and welfare of its citizens. 15
A decade ago the Supreme Court of the United States sought
to reconcile and accommodate all of these competing interests in
the seminal case of Roe v. Wade. 6 The issue in Roe was whether a
Texas statute that prohibited abortions except for the purpose of
saving the mother's life was unconstitutional. 7 To decide the issue
the Court first had to ascertain whether a woman's right to obtain
an abortion was constitutionally protected. The Court afforded the
right constitutional protection by holding that the right of privacy
founded in the fourteenth amendment's concept of personal liberty
"is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy.""
The Court declared, however, that a woman's right to obtain
an abortion was not absolute or unqualified-the right "must be
considered against important state interests in regulation."' 9 A
state, the Court decided, has two compelling interests in regulating
abortion, each of which becomes compelling at different stages in
the pregnancy. The state's interest in protecting maternal health
04 (1980).
13. Id. at 502-03.
14. See id. at 500-02. When the interest of the unborn is considered, the primary issue
is at what point a fetus ceases to be a mere potential life and becomes a human being that is
afforded constitutional protection. One extreme contends that life begins at conception. d.
at 500. Adherents of this view would prohibit all abortions because an abortion during any
stage of pregnancy would in effect be the killing of a human being. The other extreme holds
that life begins at birth. Id. at 500-01. Adherents of this view would allow abortions to be
performed during any stage of pregnancy because a "human being," as defined by the proponents of this view, is not involved in the abortion issue until birth.
15. Id. at 503-04.
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
17. Id. at 129.
18. d. at 153. The Court acknowledged:
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line of
decisions, however, going back as far as Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141
U.S. 250, 251 (1891), the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy,
or a guarantee of certain areas as zones of privacy, does exist under the
Constitution.
d. at 152. The Court first found a right of privacy in the concept of liberty as guaranteed by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
19. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
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becomes compelling at the end of the first trimester because until
then the mortality rate for abortions is lower than the mortality
rate for normal childbirth.2 0 The state's interest in protecting potential life becomes compelling when a fetus reaches viability.21

During the course of its analysis, the Court specifically addressed the controversial issue of when life begins. 22 The Court,
however, decided not to resolve the issue, reasoning that "when
those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy,
and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary,
at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a
position to speculate as to the answer. "23 Notwithstanding this reluctance, the Court did find "that the word 'person', as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn. "24
As a result of its analysis, the Court adopted a standard of
review, based on approximately each trimester of pregnancy, by
which future abortion regulation could be constitutionally examined. Under the Court's standard, a state can neither regulate
nor interfere with a woman's right to obtain an abortion during the
first trimester of pregnancy.2 During this period the decision to
abort is solely the prerogative of the woman, who is assisted in her
decision by the attending physician. 6
During the second trimester, when the state's interest in protecting maternal health becomes compelling, a state may regulate
the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably
relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health.27
The Roe Court listed several examples of permissible state regula20. Id. at 163.
21. Id. The Court defined viability as the point in time in the pregnancy when the fetus
"has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb." Id. In Roe, the Court
placed viability at seven months (28 weeks), but noted that it could occur earlier, even at 24
weeks. Id. at 160.
22. Id. at 156-62.
23. Id. at 159.
24. Id. at 158. The Court reached this conclusion by examining the word "person" as
used in the due process clause and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
and as used in other sections of the Constitution. Id. at 157. The Court concluded that
"person," as used in the Constitution, has application only postnatally. Id.
25. Id. at 163. Despite the Court's broad language that no state interference is allowed
during the first trimester, the Court has allowed some state interference during the first
trimester. For example, in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), the Court
upheld a recordkeeping requirement and a written consent requirement imposed during the
first trimester because the requirements had "no legally significant impact or consequence
on the abortion decision or on the physician-patient relationship." Id.
26. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
27. Id.
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tions during this period, including a hospitalization requirement
for second-trimester abortions. 8
After the end of the second trimester, when the fetus is viable
and the state's interest in protecting potential life becomes compelling, the state may prohibit all abortions, except those necessary
to protect the mother's life.29 Additionally, the Court noted that
any legislation seeking to regulate the fundamental right of a woman to obtain an abortion must be "narrowly drawn to express
only the compelling state interests at stake."3
After applying the facts of Roe to its newly articulated constitutional analysis, the Court concluded that because the Texas statute prohibited abortions during the first trimester of pregnancy, a
period when the decision to abort must be free of state interference, the statute violated a woman's constitutionally-protected
right to obtain an abortion. 1
On the same day that Roe was decided, the Supreme Court
decided Doe v. Bolton.32 At issue in Bolton was the constitutionality of a Georgia statute that required all abortions, including those
in the first trimester, to be performed in a hospital. 3 The Court
found the Georgia law unconstitutional because under Roe, a state
may not interfere with a woman's right to obtain an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy. 4 The Court indicated, however, that it would have invalidated the provision even if the statute had excluded the first trimester because the state had failed to
show that only hospitals could satisfy the state's interest in protecting maternal health.3
Three years after Bolton, the Court again addressed and expounded on the constitutionality of a second-trimester regulation.
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,6 the Court invalidated several provisions of a Missouri statute regulating abortions. One of
the provisions struck down prohibited the use of a certain method
of abortion-saline amniocentesis-after the first trimester of
pregnancy. The State of Missouri argued that this method was
28. Id.
29. Id. at 163-64.

30. Id. at 155.
31. Id. at 164.
32. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).

33. Id. at 192.
34. Id. at 195.
35. Id.
36. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).

37. Id. at 79.
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The Danforth Court, disagreeing with Missouri's contention,
stated several reasons why the regulation did not reasonably relate
to the state's interest in maternal health. First, the Court noted
that the use of saline amniocentesis was an accepted medical procedure."9 At the time Danforth was decided, the saline amniocentesis procedure was used in a substantial majority of all second-trimester abortions. 40 Second, few physicians used or knew
how to use the alternative technique proposed by Missouri-the
prostaglandin technique.4 ' Furthermore, Missouri had "offered no
evidence that prostaglandin abortions were available in Missouri. ' 142 Finally, the Court perceived the ban on the saline amni-

ocentesis technique as an anomaly because the Missouri statute
did not prohibit other techniques that were many times more
likely to result in maternal death.43 The Court therefore concluded
that the ban on the saline amniocentesis technique did not reasonably relate to the state's compelling interest in protecting maternal
health.4
III. Akron's

RATIONALE

Akron is one of the recent United States Supreme Court decisions concerning abortion, and it is significant for several reasons.
First, by examining the second-trimester hospitalization requirement under the trimester analysis enunciated in Roe, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the principles of Roe v. Wade.'5 Second, Akron
represents the first time that the Court has passed judgment on
the constitutionality of a regulation requiring that all second-trimester abortions be performed in a hospital.4" Third, because al38. Id. at 76.

39. Id. at 77.
40. Id. Based on the testimony of both sides, from 68% to 80% of all post-first-trimester abortions were performed by using the saline amniocentesis technique. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 78.
44. Id. at 79.
45. 103 S. Ct. at 2487.
46. Id. The majority and the dissent in Akron disagreed sharply on whether the Court's
summary affirmance in Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's Servs., Inc. v. Bowen, 496 F. Supp.
894 (N.D. Ind. 1980), afl'd mem. sub nom. Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's Servs., Inc. v. Orr,
451 U.S. 934 (1981), was binding precedent on the hospitalization requirement issue. The
majority argued:
Although the District Court in that case found that "Roe does not render the
constitutionality of second trimester regulations subject to either the availability
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most half the states in the country have a similar statutory requirement, the decision will have a nationwide impact.4 Finally, in
adjudicating the constitutionality of a second-trimester hospitalization requirement, the Court reconciled the inconsistent decisions
of the lower federal courts and the state courts."'

A. The Majority
The majority in Akron 9 analyzed the second-trimester hospitalization requirement5 0 under the trimester analysis established in
Roe. The majority felt that "the doctrine of stare decisis, while
perhaps never entirely persuasive on a constitutional question, is a
doctrine that demands respect in a society governed by the rule of
law." 51 Furthermore, medical evidence suggests that, until approxiof abortions or the improvements in medical techniques and skills," . . . it also
rested the decision on the alternative ground that the plaintiffs had failed to
provide evidence to support their theory that it was unreasonable to require hospitalization for dilatation and evacuation abortions performed early in the second trimester.
103 S. Ct. at 2494 n.18 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). As a result, the majority concluded that its summary affirmance in Gary-Northwest was not binding precedent on the
hospitalization issue. Id.
The dissent, on the other hand, insisted that the summary affirmance in Gary-Northwest was binding precedent on the hospital requirement issue. Id. at 2506 n.3 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). The dissent argued that although the majority read Gary-Northwest as being
decided on the alternate ground that the plaintiffs failed to prove the safety of secondtrimester abortions, the Court ignored "the fact that the district court in Gary-Northwest
held that 'even if the plaintiffs could prove birth more dangerous than early second trimester D & E abortions,' that would not matter insofar as the constitutionality of the regulations were [sic] concerned." Id. (quoting Gary-Northwest, 496 F. Supp. at 903).
47. See id. at 2490 n.9 (citing Brief for Americans United for Life as Amicus Curiae
(listing 23 states)).
48. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 664 F.2d 687 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding second-trimester hospitalization requirement unconstitutional), afl'd in part, 103 S. Ct.
2517 (1983); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Wynn v.
Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding second-trimester hospitalization requirement
constitutional); Livingston v. New Jersey Bd. of Medical Examiners, 168 N.J. Super. 259,
402 A.2d 967 (1979) (holding second-trimester hospitalization requirement constitutional);
Simopoulos v. Virginia, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S.E.2d 194 (1981) (holding second-trimester hospitalization requirement that included in its definition of hospital licensed outpatient clinics
constitutional), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 2532 (1983).
49. 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983) (Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Burger, C.J., and Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, J.J., joined).
50. The regulation in Akron defined hospital as "a general hospital or special hospital
devoted to gynecology or obstetrics which is accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals or by the American Osteopathic Association." Id. at 2493. "The ordinance thus prevents the performance of abortions in outpatient facilities that are not part of
an acute-care, full-service hospital." Id. at 2494.
51. Id. at 2487.
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mately the end of the first trimester, regulations that restrict the
manner in which abortions are performed would not serve the
state's interest in maternal health.5 2 The majority concluded that
"the Roe trimester standard thus continues to provide a reasonable
legal framework for limiting a State's authority to regulate abortions. 53 Under the Roe analysis, the second-trimester hospitalization requirement would withstand strict judicial scrutiny only if it
"reasonably related" to the state's interest in protecting maternal
health."'
Before applying the Roe trimester analysis, however, the majority found that the second-trimester hospital requirement placed
"a significant obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion."5 5 The Court noted the court of appeals' finding that hospitalized abortions cost twice as much as clinical abortionss and that
second-trimester abortions were rarely performed in Akron hospitals.5 7 As a result, "a second-trimester hospitalization requirement
may force women to travel to find available facilities, resulting in
both financial expense and additional health risk. ' 8 It was therefore apparent to the Akron majority that a second-trimester hospitalization requirement could significantly restrict a woman's ability
to obtain an abortion. 9
After this initial finding, the majority proceeded to examine,
under the Roe trimester analysis, Akron's contention that the second-trimester hospitalization requirement reasonably related to
the protection of maternal health.60 The majority conceded that
52. Id. at 2492 n.11.

53. Id.
54. Id. at 2493. The majority failed to address the fact that the Roe Court had listed a
second-trimester hospitalization requirement as an example of a permissible state regulation
during the second trimester. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). However, it is
apparent from the cases decided after Roe that second-trimester regulation is not per se
constitutional, but that any second-trimester regulation must reasonably relate to the state's
interest in preserving maternal health. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52 (1976) (ban on saline amniocentesis technique as an abortion procedure for second-trimester abortions must reasonably relate to state's interest in preserving maternal health);
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (regulation requiring two doctors to concur with attending physician's decision regarding abortion had no rational connection with a patient's needs
and unduly infringes on the physician's right to practice).
55. 103 S. Ct. at 2495.
56. Id. An in-hospital abortion costs from $850-$900, while a D & E abortion performed
in a clinic costs from $350-$400. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.

59. Id.
60. Id. at 2495-97.
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Akron's contention had strong support at the time of the Roe decision.61 Subsequently, however, "the safety of second-trimester
abortions has increased dramatically. The principal reason is that
the D & E procedure is now widely and successfully used for second-trimester abortions.16 2 The D & E procedure, the Court noted,

can be performed safely during the early weeks of the second trimester on an outpatient basis in nonhospital facilities." The Akron majority concluded that the Akron ordinance requiring that all
second-trimester abortions be performed in a hospital did not reasonably relate to the state's compelling interest in protecting maternal health.6 The Court, therefore, found the ordinance
5
6

unconstitutional.

B. The Dissent
The Akron dissent, on the other hand,"' forcefully argued for
the abolition of the Roe trimester approach:
[N]either sound constitutional theory nor our need to decide
cases based on the application of neutral principles can accommodate an analytical framework that varies according to stages
of pregnancy, where those stages, and their concomitant standards of review, differ according to the level of medical technology available
when a particular challenge to state regulation
67
occurs.

The dissent proceeded to note, as the majority's analysis had conceded, that "the State's compelling interest in maternal health
changes as medical technology changes."6 8 Furthermore, a state's
compelling interest in protecting potential life, which becomes
compelling at fetal viability, also depends on medical technology."
For example, at the time of Roe in 1973, viability before twenty61. Id.
62. Id. at 2496. The dilatation and evacuation technique (D & E) is the most common
procedure used for abortions. The technique "consists of dilating the woman's cervix and
the opening to the uterus and removing the fetus by means of suction and instruments."
Note, HospitalizationRequirements For Second Trimester Abortions: For the Purpose of

Health or Hindrance?, 71 GEo. L.J. 991, 1000 n.52 (1983).
63. 103 S. Ct. at 2496.
64. Id.
65. The Court also found that the regulations concerning parental consent, §
1870.05(B), informed consent, § 1870.06(B) & (C), a 24 hour waiting period, § 1870.07, and
the disposal of fetal remains were all unconstitutional. 103 S. Ct. at 2487-2504.
66. 103 S. Ct. at 2504 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
67. Id.
68. See id. at 2505.
69. Id. at 2507.
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eight weeks was considered unusual. 70 Recent studies, however,
"have demonstrated increasingly earlier fetal viability." 71 The Roe
framework, the dissent concluded, "is clearly on a collision course
''72
with itself."

As the medical risks of various abortion procedures decrease, the
point at which the State may regulate for reasons of maternal
health is moved further forward, to actual childbirth. As medical
science becomes better able to provide for the separate existence
of the fetus, the point of viability is moved further back toward
conception.7.

The dissent in Akron also stated that the state's interest concerning abortion did not become compelling at certain stages in the
pregnancy as established in Roe but that this interest was compelling throughout the pregnancy. 74 Consequently, the dissent would
allow a state to impose restrictions on the abortion decision during
the first trimester of pregnancy, a period that according to Roe and
its progeny must remain free from state interference.
The dissent's criticism did not end with its attack on the Roe
trimester framework. The dissent also contended that the proper
standard of review in the context of abortion cases was the "unduly burdensome" standard: 75 "[tihe undue burden required in the
abortion cases represents the required threshold inquiry that must
be conducted before this Court can require a State to justify its
legislative actions under the exacting 'compelling state interest
standard.' -76
Applying its undue burden standard, the dissent found that
the second-trimester hospitalization requirement did not impose
an undue burden on the abortion decision. The dissent argued that
the majority's "reliance on increased abortion costs and decreased
availability was misplaced," because there was no evidence "to
show that the two Akron hospitals that performed second-trimester abortions denied an abortion to any woman.

' 77

Additionally,

the dissent pointed out that "there was no evidence presented that
other hospitals in nearby areas did not provide second-trimester
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.

73. Id.
74. Id. at 2508.

75. Id. at 2509-12.
76. Id. at 2510 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 2512.
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abortions. Further, almost any state regulation. . . inevitably and
necessarily entails increased costs for any abortion. ' 78 The dissent
then found that because the hospitalization requirement did not
impose an undue burden, it was not necessary to apply the compelling interest standard of review and examine the requirement
under strict judicial scrutiny.79 Finally, applying its less stringent
standard of review, the dissent concluded that the hospitalization
requirement regulation had a "rational relation" to the valid state
objective of ensuring the health and welfare of its citizens. 80 Accordingly, the dissent would have upheld the provision as
constitutional."
IV.

A

COMMENTARY ON

Akron

A close examination of the Akron decision and of prior case
law buttresses the conclusion that the majority in Akron applied
the appropriate standard of review and reached the correct result.
The principles of Roe v. Wade, and the subsequent decisions of
Bolton and Danforth, require not only that all abortion regulation
during the second trimester reasonably relate to the state's compelling interest in maternal health, but also that the regulations be
narrowly drawn to protect that restricted interest.82 Additionally,
because the right to obtain an abortion is a fundamental right, any
regulation of the abortion decision must be examined under strict
judicial scrutiny. 83 Because abortions in the early weeks of the second trimester may now be performed as safely in an outpatient
clinic as in a hospital, the majority correctly concluded that the
Akron ordinance requiring that all second-trimester abortions be
performed in hospitals did not reasonably relate to the state's compelling interest in maternal health. Therefore, because the ordinance prohibited all second-trimester abortions from being performed in nonhospital facilities, the ordinance was not narrowly
drafted to express and protect only the state's interest in maternal
health.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2512-13.
80. Id. at 2513.
81. The dissent also found the remaining challenged regulations constitutional because
none of them placed an "undue burden" on a woman's right to obtain an abortion. Id. at
2513-17.
82. See Note, supra note 62, at 1004.
83. See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-
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The majority's analysis regarding the appropriate standard of
review, however, was flawed to a certain extent. Before correctly
applying the reasonably related standard, the majority first analyzed the second-trimester hospitalization requirement under an
unduly burdensome standard.8 4 By initially applying the latter
standard of analysis, the majority obfuscated the correct reasonably related standard established in Roe and added fuel to the dissent's argument that the unduly burdensome test was the appropriate standard of review.85
Under the standard enunciated in Roe, a court first analyzes
the regulation to ascertain whether it imposes any burden on the
right to obtain an abortion."6 "The question . . . is not one of degree but simply whether the regulation affirmatively imposes any
legally cognizable burden."" If any affirmative burden is imposed,
strict judicial scrutiny is applied and the state must justify the
burden by showing a compelling state interest in a regulation narrowly drawn to protect such an interest. 8' Alternatively, if no affirmative burden is placed on the abortion decision, strict judicial
scrutiny will not be applied and the regulation will be upheld if the
legislature had a rational basis for enacting the regulation.' 9 The
84. 103 S. Ct. at 2495.
85. The unduly burdensome standard so fervently propounded in the Akron dissent is
inappropriate for constitutionally examining second-trimester abortion regulations; it represents an ingenious, subtle, and ultra-conservative position that would result in courts upholding virtually any regulation imposed on the abortion decision. The dissent applying its
unduly burdensome standard, for example, found that none of the regulations at issue in
Akron imposed a significant burden on the abortion decision. As a result, according to the
dissent's standard of review, the threshold inquiry had not been met and strict judicial scrutiny need not be applied. The dissent eventually found all the contested regulations to be
constitutional because they satisfied the rational basis test.
The unduly burdensome standard, apart from being the incorrect standard in the abortion area, also has several flaws. First, by requiring a plaintiff to prove an undue burden at
the outset of a case, a court is essentially requiring the plaintiff to address the ultimate
constitutional issue. Note, supra note 62, at 1011-12. Therefore, "a determination that a
burden is substantial is the final result of the case and not a threshold burden for the plaintiff." Id. at 1012. Second, the unduly burdensome standard "fails to recognize that it is the
character of the right infringed, not the degree of infringement, that determines the constitutional standard of review." Id. A final flaw of the unduly burdensome standard is the
inability of courts to apply the substantial burden test in a principled fashion because the
standard "fails to define either the degree of burden a plaintiff must show or the elements,
such as cost, access, or safety, that courts should consider in making the determination." Id.
86. Brief Amici Curiae of Certain Law Professors at 32, Simopoulos v. Virginia, cert.
granted, 102 S.Ct. 2265 (1982).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 33.
89. Id. at 32; see, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (the Hyde Amendment,
which severely limits the use of any federal funds to reimburse the cost of abortions under
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Akron majority, therefore, only needed to inquire whether any affirmative burden, as opposed to an undue burden, had been placed
on the abortion decision. Having found such an affirmative burden,
the Court then should have strictly scrutinized the regulation.
Consequently, by analyzing the second-trimester hospitalization
requirement under an unduly burdensome standard before applying the correct reasonably related standard, the majority has increased the confusion already present in the area of abortion law."
Lower courts interpreting the majority's decision will struggle to
ascertain the appropriate standard of review.
On a policy level, the Akron decision undoubtedly will have
positive ramifications. As the majority noted, abortions performed
in hospitals cost twice as much as those performed in outpatient
facilities.9 1 The effect of such a difference in cost would be to place
second-trimester abortions well beyond the financial reach of most
indigent women. By striking down the second-trimester hospitalization requirement, the majority reserved for indigent women the
opportunity to have their second-trimester abortions performed in
adequate health care facilities instead of having them performed in
the illegal and dangerous "backrooms" of the pre-Roe era.
Although the Akron decision appears to invalidate every second-trimester hospitalization requirement in the country, its holding is narrower than it appears. To truly ascertain the breadth of
the majority's holding, it is necessary to examine Simopoulos v.
the medicaid program, places no government obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses
to terminate her pregnancy, but rather, by means of unequal subsidization of abortion and
other medical services, encourages alternative activity deemed in the public interest); Maher
v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (Connecticut regulation does not impinge upon a woman's fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy because that right implies no limitation on a
state's authority to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion and to implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds).
90. 103 S. Ct. at 2495. Lower state and federal courts have analyzed second-trimester
hospitalization requirements under various standards of review. See, e.g., Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848 (8th Cir.), aft'd, 664 F.2d 687 (8th Cir. 1981)
(invalidating second-trimester hospitalization requirement after applying undue burden
standard), aff'd in part, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983); Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's Servs., Inc. v.
Bowen, 496 F. Supp. 894 (N.D. Ind. 1980) (holding second-trimester hospitalization requirement per se constitutional because Roe listed such a requirement as an example of a permissible state regulation during the second trimester), aff'd mem. sub norn. Gary-Northwest
Ind. Women's Servs., Inc. v. Orr, 451 U.S. 934 (1981); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302
(N.D. Ill. 1978), aff'd sub nor. Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding secondtrimester hospitalization requirement constitutional under a rational basis standard of review); see also Note, supra note 62, at 1004-19 (discussing in depth the different standards
of review lower courts have applied to second-trimester hospitalization requirements).
91. 103 S. Ct. at 2495.
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Virginia,92 which was decided on the same day as Akron. In Simopoulos, the Court upheld a second-trimester hospitalization requirement almost identical to the one struck down in Akron. 3 The
regulation at issue in Simopoulos, however, included outpatient
clinics in its definition of "hospital."9 ' As a result, the hospitalization requirement in Simopoulos, unlike the one in Akron, did not
require second-trimester abortions to be performed in general
acute-care facilities.9 5 Because of this difference, the Court found
that the decision in Akron was not controlling. 6 The Court's emphasis on the difference between abortions performed in acute-care
facilities and those performed in outpatient clinics further underscores the Court's concern with the potentially dangerous ramifications of high cost abortions.
The most troubling aspect of the Akron decision, however,
concerns not what the majority decided, but what the majority
failed to address.9 7 Under Roe, a state's interest in potential life
becomes compelling when a fetus reaches viability.9 8 At this stage
of pregnancy the state may, if it wishes, prohibit abortions.9 Viability, as defined by Roe, is the stage in its development when a
fetus is "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit
with artificial aid."' 00 In 1973, when Roe was decided, viability was
placed at twenty-eight weeks; however, the Roe Court noted that it
could occur earlier, even at twenty-four weeks. 01 The danger with
this definition and the standard of review based on this definition
is that both are dependent on medical technology."0 2 The Akron
dissent, for example, noted that "fetal viability in the first trimester of pregnancy may be possible in the not too distant future."' '
92. 103 S. Ct. 2532 (1983).
93. Id. at 2540.
94. Id. at 2536-37.
95. Id. at 2538.
96. Id. at 2539.
97. In all fairness to the Akron majority it should be noted that the validity of Roe's
trimester analysis was not at issue in Akron. As the dissent itself pointed out, the validity of
Roe had not been argued by the parties or addressed by the lower courts. 103 S. Ct. at 2504
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
98. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
99. Id. at 163-64.
100. Id. at 160.
101. Id.
102. See 103 S. Ct. at 2507 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Note, Technological
Advances and Roe v. Wade: The Need to Rethink Abortion Law, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1194
(1982) (arguing for abolition of Roe's trimester approach and advocating an alternative
based on a standard to determine the beginning of life).

103. 103 S. Ct. at 2507 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that "[a]n infant
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Consequently, it is plausible that as medical technology progresses
and pushes fetal viability back toward conception, states may attempt to prohibit abortions performed during the second trimester, and perhaps even those performed during the first trimester of
pregnancy.
The state's interest in protecting maternal health, which becomes compelling during the beginning of the second trimester, is
also dependent on medical technology. As medical technology progresses and abortion procedures become increasingly safer, the
state's right to regulate in order to protect maternal health is diminished.""4 The Akron majority, for example, noted that although
a second-trimester hospitalization requirement had strong support
at the time of Roe as a reasonable health regulation, such a regulation no longer reasonably related to the state's interest in maternal
health because the D & E procedure "is now widely and success10 5
fully used for second trimester abortions.

The eventual advances in medical technology therefore will diminish a woman's right to obtain an abortion and concomitantly
enlarge that same right: a state will be able to prohibit abortions at
an earlier stage, as viability occurs earlier during pregnancy, but it
will be forced to regulate the abortion decision less as abortion
procedures become increasingly safer. Accordingly, the Akron dissent's admonition that the Roe trimester analysis is on a "collisioncourse" with itself might prove prophetic.
By reaffirming Roe's trimester analysis with its evident ties to
medical technology, the Supreme Court in Akron failed to address
an issue that in the near future undoubtedly will be back before
the Court. Eventually, when that issue is presented to the Court,
several alternatives-although by no means the only ones-might
be more feasible than Roe's trimester analysis.
A first alternative would be for the Court to hold that Roe's
trimester analysis is not dependent on medical progress.' This alternative would preserve the "bright line" dichotomy the Roe decision supposedly established and the compromise the Roe Court
weighing 484 grams and having a gestational age of 22 weeks at birth is now thriving in a
Los Angeles hospital, and the attending physician has stated that the infant has a '95%
chance of survival.'" Id. at 2507 n.5 (citing Wash. Post, Mar. 31, 1983, at A2, col. 2).
104. See 103 S. Ct. at 2507 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
105. 103 S. Ct. at 2496 (emphasis added).
106. See Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's Servs., Inc. v. Bowen, 496 F. Supp. 894 (N.D.
Ind. 1980) (advocating that the Roe trimester analysis is not dependent on medical technology), aff'd mem. sub nom. Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's Servs., Inc. v. Orr, 451 U.S. 934
(1981).
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sought to reach between the abortion and antiabortion factions. In
addition, if the Court eventually divorces medical technology from
Roe's trimester analysis, courts would no longer be required to
make in-depth examinations of complex medical facts. 107
Modifying Roe's trimester analysis by severing its ties to medical technology, however, might destroy Roe's underlying rationale.
The Roe Court did not establish its trimester analysis arbitrarily;
it justified its trimester standard by using evidence of the medical
technology present at the time. The Court specifically found that
the state's interest in maternal health became compelling at the
end of the first trimester "because . . . until the end of the first

trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth."' 108 With respect to the state's compelling interest
in protecting potential life, the Court found that interest compelling at the end of the first trimester because at that time the fetus
becomes viable and, therefore, "has the capability of meaningful
life outside the mother's womb."109 Accordingly, if the Court eventually severs the ties that the Roe trimester analysis has with medical technology, the Court will be destroying the policy underpinnings of the constitutional doctrine enunciated in Roe v. Wade.
A second alternative would be for the Court to hold that abortion is strictly a woman's private and moral decision.110 Because
there is no legal, social, or religious consensus on when life begins,
the Court can decide that the dilemma11of
the abortion decision
1
woman.
individual
each
to
left
be
should
The consequences of this alternative seem obvious. First, the
decision in Roe v. Wade would have to be overruled because the
right established in Roe, although fundamental, was nevertheless
limited by the state's interest in protecting maternal health and
potential life. Moreover, if the Court were to hold that the decision
to abort is solely in the hands of the woman, the Court in effect
would be upholding one right, but eradicating another-the unascertainable right of the individual fetus.
A third alternative, a total prohibition of abortion, would force
the Court to afford a fetus constitutional protection. 2 In other
107. Id. at 900.
108. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
109. Id.
110. Chemerinsky, Rationalizing the Abortion Debate: Legal Rhetoric and the Abortion Controversy, 31 BUFFALO L. REV. 107, 126 (1982).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 111.
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words, the Court would be required to modify its definition of
"human life" and "persons" to include fetuses during early pregnancy"' or define the beginning of life at conception. This alternative would be consistent with the current trend in medical technol4
ogy recognizing the fetus as a separate entity:"
There is so much new science and technology pertaining to fetal
treatment and diagnosis that the traditional manner of viewing
pregnancy has changed. The mother is no longer seen as the sole
patient. The fetus is no longer a mere organ of the mother; it is
capable of being treated and diagnosed and is considered a patient itself."5
The total prohibition of abortion would also ensure that the fetus,
who until now has not had a voice in the abortion decision, is constitutionally protected.
The antiabortion alternative, as do the other alternatives,
presents problems. A ban on abortion, based on the premise that a
fetus is a human life, will prohibit states from discriminating
''against persons who are fetuses by offering them less protection
than the other individuals in society."" 6 As a result, not only
would statutes that allow abortions on demand be constitutionally
impermissible, but even restrictive statutes, such as those permitting abortion in a case of rape or incest, would be
7
unconstitutional. 11
Additionally, if fetuses are treated as persons "there is no legal
basis for punishing abortion differently than homicide." 1 8 Historically, however, abortion has not been punished as a homicide; punishment for criminal abortion has been less severe than punishment for homicide." 9
Finally, if the Court were to hold that fetuses are constitutionally protected persons, "[t]he standard of prenatal care could be
defined by the government.' 0 It is, therefore, quite conceivable
that individuals wishing to protect the fetus would bring tort ac113. Id.
114. Note, Current Technology Affecting Supreme Court Abortion Jurisprudence, 27
N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 1221, 1241 (1982).
115. Id.

116. Chemerinsky, supra note 110, at 112-13 (citing L.
929 (1978)).
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117.
118.
119.
120.
at 6, 8.

Chemerinsky, supra note 110, at 113.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Hudson-Nicholas, Is Abortion a Women's Issue? Pro-Choice, 5
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tions against the mother for negligently exposing the fetus to
1 21
illnesses.
V.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, although the Akron majority's decision reaffirmed the principles of Roe v. Wade and reached the correct legal
result, the decision has left several troubling problems unresolved.
Ironically, these problems might eventually erode the right that
Roe v. Wade sought to establish and preserve: a woman's right to
terminate her pregnancy. For the time being, however, stare decisis
prevails. A more intriguing issue is for how long?
PETER PRIETO
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